intrusions based on the level and specific characteristics of network traffic. Similarly, an airport security organization infers the risk associated with a passenger by gathering and processing information about the passenger and his or her luggage. Policy organizations may also contain IEs to estimate the cost and effectiveness of policy changes. Finally, the underwriting group of a financial organization is an IE that predicts the likelihood that a borrower will repay a loan. In all of these cases, the IE might be interested in evaluating how well it is performing, or how its performance might change if it modified its procedures or obtained additional information. An inference enterprise model (IEM) is a tool for conducting this evaluation.
We demonstrate that our success in solving a set of increasingly complex challenge problems is associated with an inference enterprise (IE) using inference enterprise models (IEMs). As part of a sponsored research competition, we created a multimodeling inference enterprise modeling (MIEM) process to achieve winning scores on a spectrum of challenge problems related to insider threat detection. We present in general terms the motivation for and description of our MIEM solution. We then present the results of applying MIEM across a range of challenge problems, with a detailed illustration for one challenge problem. Finally, we discuss the science and promise of IEM and MIEM, including the applicability of MIEM to a spectrum of inference domains. Successful organizations (or enterprises) continually adjust their operational capability and processes to improve mission performance. To perform these adjustments, the organizations scan the internal and external environments to find indicators of potential threats and opportunities. These threats and opportunities might include security threats from competitors or malicious insiders, changes in demand due to economic conditions, development of competing products or services by other organizations, or changes in government policies and regulations. In these cases, the indicators present an incomplete picture of the nature and potential magnitude of the threat or opportunity. Consequently, the organization must infer the underlying situation based on its observations. Often organizations will establish internal units whose purpose is to scan the environment; identify, collect, and organize relevant information; and infer the meaning of the observations, as it relates to their mission. We will designate these groups as inference enterprises (IEs). This paper defines the scientific foundations for modeling the inferences made by such an enterprise. Such models support analyses of the effectiveness of an IE, as well as decisions to reengineer or modify the IE to improve the performance. The paper introduces a multimodeling approach to IE modeling that has proven successful in predicting how changes to an enterprise's collection and inference methods used to detect insider threats will affect the accuracy of its inferences.
More formally, an IE is an entity within an organization that uses data, tools, people, and processes to make inferences about variables that are critical to the success of the organization. Both the type of organization and the issues about which inferences are made can vary widely. For example, an IE within a cyber-operations center might infer the likelihood of cyber
| CHALLENGES AND METHODS FOR INDUCTIVE INFERENCE
Logical inference is commonly divided into deduction and induction, with some writers including abduction (Josephson & Josephson, 1994) . Deductive inference is reasoning from general premises to specific conclusions using formal logics that are deterministic. By contrast, inductive inference is reasoning from specific evidence to general or universal conclusions, using probabilistic or statistical methods or other logics (e.g., fuzzy or nonmonotonic logics). Inductive inference attempts to establish uncertainties associated with specific conclusions that can be reached. Finally, abductive inference is reasoning from specific evidence to the most likely or best explanation. This paper addresses only inductive inference. Figure 1 provides a summary of the eight most common inductive inference problems (de la Higuera, 2010; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006; Wikipedia, 2017) . In this paper, we focus on prediction.
There are many issues related to the available evidence that make inductive inference performance difficult in general. These challenges are especially problematic for prediction. Noisy data and missing data points are common in statistical modeling, Bayesian inference, and data mining. Noisy data is most commonly defined as data corrupted by a large amount of information unrelated to the signal of interest. Missing data scattered throughout the data fields and records are problematic because the missing fields may be valuable predictors for the inference of interest. A further problem is that some inference tools expect complete data, requiring a preprocessing step of imputing values for the missing fields. A nonrepresentative sample, which might result from missing data records, generally indicates the data sample is biased, which necessitates some explicit or implicit adjustment to the model results. For some problems, individual observations are not available and summary statistics (e.g., means, SD, correlations) or binned data are provided for each variable. This use of summary statistics places a far greater limitation on modeling than is commonly encountered and is an issue that we address in detail. Another issue is the problem of highly imbalanced data, which occurs when predicting a rare condition or outcome. For example, insider threat actions such as major fraud or intellectual property theft tend to be rare, and therefore present a special challenge.
Methods for inductive reasoning have been developed in the areas of logic and expert systems (Groarke, 2017) , inferential statistics (both frequentist and Bayesian philosophies of probability) (Box & Tiao, 1992; DeGroot, 2004; Fisher, 1955; Jaynes, 2003; Neyman, 1956; Reid & Cox, 2015) , fuzzy inference (Cherkassky, 1998; Mamdani & Assilian, 1975; Sugeno, 1985) , and nonmonotonic logics (in contrast to traditional logic and expert systems) (Donini, Lenzerini, Nardi, Pirri, & Schaerf, 1990; Ginsberg, 1987) . Given our focus on the prediction problem within inductive inference, we address only methods that produce probabilities, including: a subset of frequentist-oriented statistical inference methods (e.g., logistic regression), Bayesian inference that produces probabilities (e.g., Bayes rule), and a range of machine-learning methods that are undeclared in the frequentist-Bayesian debates but are routinely trained to produce probabilities as outputs (e.g., random forests and neural networks).
| MULTIMODELING FOR IEM SUCCESS
Our proposed approach for addressing the IEM inference tasks uses multimodeling. Our multimodeling for IEM, or multimodeling inference enterprise modeling (MIEM) approach, funded by IARPA, is the subject of this paper. Building a model for a complex problem often requires bringing together multiple interoperating models that complement and/or supplement each other. The different models may be based on different modeling formalisms and may each provide unique strengths and insights (Levis & Jbara, 2013; Levis, Zaidi, & Rafi, 2012) . It has also been demonstrated that aggregating across an ensemble of competing models can improve performance over the individual models. This has been demonstrated in forecasting (Clemen, 1989; Collopy & Armstrong, 1992) as well as data mining (Pardos, Gowda, Baker, & Heffernan, 2012) .
Many challenges arise in solving the semantic and syntactic integration mismatches that naturally arise when combining models that may be based on different modeling formalisms and were not originally intended to interoperate. Levis et al. (2012) presented a theoretical foundation for interoperation among models using different modeling formalisms. Figure 2 provides a high-level schematic of the meta-model that evolved as our MIEM solution to the many CPs addressed over six quarters as part of the IARPA SCITE program. This figure shows that an initial assessment of the data for key A ststement in the form of "a probability that a population P will perform a behaviour B 1 or exhibit an attribute A 1 in some future time period" is needed. Data exists in past time periods about a similar population Q Performing similar behaviors B i or having similar attributes A j . This past data is used to generate a probability distribution over B i or A j for a future time period.
x% of the population P has attribute A, so the probability that a specific person in P has A is x/100 P' is subset of population P; x% of P has attribute A; so the probability that a specific person in P has attribute A is x/100 2 entities (P and Q) have common properties A, B, C; if P has property G, then Q probably does
Property induction:
Grammar induction:
Induction inference
Causal inference:
Prediction:
Statistical syllogism:
Simple induction:
Analogy:
FIGURE 1 Common inductive inference problems
Data analysis and preparation, with expert elicitation of missing data as needed.
Population synthesis

Down-select algorithm application, per question
Model fusion with calculation of the mean and 60% certainty interval, by question FIGURE 2 Multimodeling inference enterprise modeling (MIEM) meta-model variables and missing information is made. Often, we made a determination that key information about the threat population was missing. In these cases, we designed and executed an elicitation process to collect expert judgments about the difference between threats and nonthreats as well as significant correlation data. The multimodeling is executed in the middle with answers created for each question. Finally, there is a model fusion across questions so that the fused means and 60% certainty intervals can be calculated. A more detailed version of this figure will be discussed in the next section.
Since the CPs posed to us and the other teams changed significantly each quarter, we used a wide range of modeling methods, which are listed in Table 1 . Some methods were used to generate randomized populations of the organization of interest; others were used as the down-select mechanism for separating estimated threats from nonthreats; and still others were used to fuse the answers across the models into a single answer. The multiple modeling methods that were used in Step 1 of Figure 2 address the generation of simulated populations. For the CPs described in this paper, the CP dictated the down-select algorithm(s) to be used to classify threats and nonthreats. For each CP, subsets of a team of analysts built different complete models as part of the model composition element of multi-modeling for generating the simulated populations and downselecting into threat and nonthreat classes. We are examining various model fusion algorithms and investigating how much improvement in IEM performance metrics can be achieved by using more than one down-select algorithm.
The scientific disciplines that underlie our MIEM approach are summarized in Table 2 . Data analytics is key to gaining an understanding of the underlying data that is used to build models. Probability theory provides the basis for nearly all modeling methods used in forecasting. Violating the laws of probability theory is a quick road to disaster (Wright & Hicks, 2007) . There are many types of models that can be used for forecasting in general and MIEM in particular. The mathematical and statistical modeling methods we have used in our current activities are listed in Table 2 . Optimizing parameters in models is key to improving the overall performance. While there are many optimization methods available, those we have used so far are included in Table 2 . Gathering and organizing knowledge about the problem and the workflow associated with solving the problem can prove as critical to successful performance as selecting the right data and the right modeling methods For some CPs, particularly 1-12, elicitation of expert judgment was used to obtain data that enabled us to perform substantially better than our competitors (see Figure 5 in Section 6). Two types of information were missing in these problems: (a) information that distinguished the distribution of observable variables as a function of target behaviors and (b) correlations between observable variable distributions. We designed elicitation tools and methods to obtain the required information, employing several procedures to minimize sources of bias.
To obtain information about the relationship between the distribution of observables and the target behavior state, we asked the experts to assess the likelihood that each person (as represented by a simulated profile of observable values) would show the target behavior. Following the recommendations of Gigerenzer and Edwards (2003) , we assessed conditional probabilities as frequencies rather than proportions, to produce more accurate and coherent judgments. In addition, we designed the assessment process to minimize bias (Chang, Chen, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2016) . We instructed the experts to look at the marginal distributions of the observable values, so that they would pay sufficient attention to the base rate and provided a complete distribution of observable values, so that the analysts could determine how extreme obtained values were. In addition, we provided instructions to highlight that the observable values provided to the experts were incomplete and uncertain. Finally, the experts were reminded that some individuals might exhibit the target behavior without showing clues for any of the observables.
In one of the CPs, intercorrelations between observables were not provided, and we were required to assess them based on expert judgments. It is difficult to estimate correlations, and nonzero correlations are often assessed, even when they are empirically absent (Chapman, 1967) . Tversky and Kahneman (1973) have explained this phenomenon using the availability heuristic, which is the tendency to judge an event as probable to the extent that instances of the event are readily available for recall. To minimize the effects of availability, we provided the experts with graphical and tabular representations of the potential correlations between the observables. The expert would select the correlation using a slider, and the display would be updated automatically. When the expert was satisfied with the joint distribution, he or she would click on a button to record the choice and enter any rationale for the level of correlation selected. The Gaussian copula was used to simulate a joint distribution that matched the marginal distributions of the observables and the correlation being selected by the expert. These methods are described in greater detail by (Sticha, Diaz, Axelrad, Vermillion, & Buede, 2018) .
Finally, formalizing the knowledge for a particular domain into an ontology dramatically improves communication, which in turn improves the application of these scientific disciplines to MIEM. Furthermore, ontologies provide a computable representation of domain knowledge that can support automated support for the modeling process. As part of this effort, we have advanced the state-of-the-art for an insider threat taxonomy (Greitzer, Purl, Leong, & Becker, 2018) .
| DESCRIPTON OF INSIDER THREAT CHALLENGE PROBLEMS FOR MIEM
The insider threat has been defined as "a current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data and who intentionally (or unintentionally) exceeds or misuses that access to negatively affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information systems" (ISO, 2011) . Because of the trust placed in them and their inside knowledge, insiders can cause especially damaging impacts. For this reason, addressing the insider threat is increasingly recognized as a serious concern by security professionals.
There is a wide range of insider threat behaviors, from accidental compromise to deliberate sabotage. A comprehensive reference on different kinds of insider threat and best practices for prevention, detection, and response can be found in (Capelli, Moore, & Trzeciak, 2012) . The typical organization collects, monitors, and processes data on user activities to identify individuals of possible concern. The data are processed and analyzed to infer indicators, or patterns of observables, related to target behaviors of interest. It has been argued that effective identification and response to the insider threat requires understanding complex patterns of behavioral, psychological, and technical indicators that characterize the incident types of concern (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010). (Greitzer et al., 2018 ) present a comprehensive ontology of sociotechnical and organizational factors related to insider threats. These include behaviors of concern, indicators related to the behaviors of concern, and observables extracted from data collected by the organization.
The MIEM approach was applied to 16 challenge problems in the insider threat domain. These challenge problems represented various aspects of insider threat behavior, as depicted in Table 3 . While some of these behaviors are clearly indicative of a potential insider threat, other behaviors were used as proxies for threatening behavior. Examination of Table 3 reveals relationships between different challenge problems that could be exploited in a comprehensive insider threat model. For example, CP 2, CP6, and CP 7 all relate to transfer, sending, and receipt of data; CP 12 relates to an individual's job category; and CP 10 relates to individuals who may be planning to leave the organization. Models for these challenge problems might be combined, and perhaps augmented with psychological profile information, into a model for predicting data exfiltration by disgruntled employees planning to leave the organization. Such a comprehensive model is beyond the scope of this work. We note that the observables used in these challenge problems have been mapped to the comprehensive insider threat ontology reported in (Greitzer et al., 2018) .
To compare the MIEM approach against ground truth data, these target behaviors were used instead in the later CPs. In CPs 1-15, the competing teams were not provided any data on individuals within the organization of interest, which was labeled organization A. All the data provided was aggregated into summary statistics or histograms. In CPs 10-15, separate aggregate data was provided for threats or targets versus nonthreats or nontargets. CP 16 was unique in that it was the only problem for which data on the daily activities of anonymous users were provided. These data were simulated based on the actual behaviors of people at an unidentified organization B.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 provide the numbers of indicators and observables. In the early CPs, the indicators and observables were the same and were fairly few in number. As the project continued, the indicators and observables diverged and the number increased. We typically ignored the indicator distinction because it was typically not operationally defined.
Ground truth for the behavior was handled in several ways. For the first nine CPs, the independent support contractor did not know the ground truth. For these CPs, the independent support contractor developed an expert elicitation process to predict the number of threats using experts within organization A. As we had limited information about the actual threats or targets in these first nine CPs, our team also developed an expert elicitation process to provide estimates for samples of our randomized populations (Sticha et al., 2018) . In addition to providing our team with information about the threats, this elicitation process also introduced uncertainty into our estimates analogous to what the independent support contractor introduced when using expert elicitation.
In all the CPs, the independent support contractor dictated the down-select algorithm and decision threshold that would be used to classify individuals as threat/targets or nonthreats/targets. As the CPs evolved, these down-select algorithms became more complex and more representative of data-mining methods. The number of down-select algorithms per CP also increased over time.
The 10th column of Table 3 shows that the early CPs defined a threshold for an alert on each observable. Starting with CP 10, these explicit definitions of alerts were no longer provided. In these later cases, the thresholds for alerts or binning of observables were left up to the competing teams, which is more consistent with good data-mining practice.
The period of interest for each CP varied widely from 10 days to a few months to nearly a year. Specifics about the data provided are given in the last three columns of Table 3 .
As previously discussed, each of the first 15 CPs contained aggregated data across individuals for multiple observables across one or more periods. The correlations across people between pairs of observables were often available, but not always. When it was not, we elicited such data from seasoned analysts on our team. Sometimes autocorrelations between points in time for individuals were provided. Our resulting simulated populations were represented in three-dimensional space.
| APPLICATIONS OF MIEM
We applied our MIEM approach to the 16 CPs summarized in Table 3 . Figure 3 provides a more detailed illustration of our current approach to applying MIEM to such CPs. This MIEM approach uses a hybrid modeling process that combines sophisticated analytics with human judgment and invokes two different initial processes based on the specific conditions for a given CP. If no or limited data are provided for the threats and indicators, steps 1(a)-1(c) are completed. By contrast, if some data are provided for the threats and indicators, only step 1 is completed.
The CPs that include population summary statistics for observables and describe an IEM's rules for combining detector values and down-selecting cases that alert may or may not include data on threats and indicators. To assess ground truth for employees' observables and target behaviors, the evaluation team used two approaches, based on anonymized data from an actual organization. For CPs 10-16, there was ground truth about the target behaviors. For CPs 1-9, ground truth for the anonymized data did not exist for the target behaviors. For this second case, the independent support contractor created a stratified sample of people likely and unlikely to exhibit the target behavior, with greater representation in the sample of people who were likely to exhibit the target behavior. The independent support contractor used expert judgment to identify people in both samples that the experts believed would exhibit the target behavior. The data provided to the experts included additional variables for the anonymized people in the two samples. Each expert provided an individual assessment with a follow-on reconciliation session to arrive at a single prediction. A statistical extrapolation was then computed for the entire population based on the reconciled samples.
Step 1 of our approach is illustrated in Figure 3 :
• Our team creates a discrete event model to simulate missing data. This discrete event model can call R or Python to use multiple statistical techniques (e.g., kernel density estimation and copula methods) to create simulated populations of employees in organization A that match the aggregated statistics given for organization A. These simulated employees are represented as cases of observable profiles.
• To associate case profiles with values for threats and indicators, we use elicitation methods to develop data that augments the data provided. Inferences are implemented in a Bayesian network following the process in 1(a)-1(c). • In 1(a), human analysts are identified to make indicator and target behavior judgments, as well as create subsamples of threat and nonthreat behaviors for the elicitation process. Each representative threat or nonthreat would have a simulated observable profile that is transformed to observable values interpretable to SMEs. For example, a real observable may be the rank-order of users sending emails in a month, but the observable value for the SMEs would be the actual number of emails sent in that month. These observable profiles for the subsamples of threats and nonthreats would then be placed in an elicitation packet and provided to the SMEs with some explanations and answers to SME questions. • In 1(b), the SMEs individually record their responses to the survey questions. These responses include (a) designation of each randomized individual as a threat or nonthreat, (b) selection of a word phrase like "nearly certain" or "not likely" that the randomized individual is a threat, and (c) a probability between 0 and 1 that the randomized individual is a threat. Each of these responses is used in various forms of the MIEM effort to fit one or more models. • In 1(c), the SMEs are brought together with the modelers. The SMEs describe their reasoning processes for their judgments, discuss the sampled individuals on which they disagreed and agree to make changes in some situations, but not all to achieve greater consistency, and answer questions from the modelers about their reasoning processes and specific sampled individuals. We have used two SMEs in our elicitation process, though we would have preferred three to five SMEs for greater diversity. Our team then uses neural networks to generalize the analysts' judgments to a broader solution space of potential cases. These cases are then used to train a Bayesian network model that can be used to infer indicator and target behaviors for any simulated observable profile.
In step 2, the CP is studied and key variations in assumptions and potential noise sources are identified. These assumptions and potential noise sources are used to create a range of scenarios for creating simulated populations. The appropriate discrete event simulation or copula model incorporates these assumptions and noise sources to simulate multiple differing workforce populations (step 3) as sets of cases of observable profiles, with each case associated with its alert (based on the alerting rules in the CP) and its indicators and target behavior status (using the Bayesian network). Most of the multimodeling in MIEM to date has been performed in step 3.
Step 4 applies the single or multiple down-select algorithms for determining which individuals in each simulated population are labeled as threats (alerts) or nonthreats (no alerts) based on a predetermined decision threshold (see Table 3 ). Future activities in MIEM are going to involve multimodeling in this step as multiple down-select algorithms/thresholds are developed.
Step 5 calculates the answer for each question associated with a CP for a given simulated population. Most questions asked for estimates of three IEM performance metrics: 
• Precision (p): relative frequency of alert cases which exhibit target behavior:
• False positive rate (fpr): relative frequency of alerts among cases not exhibiting target behavior:
Step 6 cycles through step 5 for each simulated workforce for a given model so that the mean and a 60% certainty interval can be calculated for each model on each question. At this point, each down-select algorithm or model in the suite of models has a probability distribution defined for each answer.
Step 7 combines or fuses the answers across the models in the multimodel suite to get final answers (mean and 60% certainty interval) for each question of the CP. To date, we have used a combination of linear opinion pooling and modeler expert judgment to create these final answers across the suite of MIEM models. In addition, we have primarily used expert judgment to determine the width of the 60% certainty intervals, based upon the agreement or lack thereof of the MIEM models. Figure 4 describes our multimodeling approach for both simulated populations (left half ) and the down-select of simulated individuals (right half ). The first example for simulated population generation of the range of solutions that we developed across the 16 CPs shows two different methods for achieving a simulated demonstration, both of which were commonly used on the same CP to obtain variations in the simulated populations. The second example for simulated population generation shows a sequence (composition) of three models with the elicitation results feeding the model in the middle. This second approach was used extensively when the correlation or threat data were not provided and had to be estimated by elicitations.
The two examples for down-select algorithms show compositions of models; in the second case, the results of competing models are run through a model fusion algorithm to compute a single answer. For every CP, one multimodeling approach was used to generate simulated populations, which then provided input to one multimodeling approach for the down-select algorithm. For every CP, there was also iteration with humans in the loop to review the results and adjust the whole multimodeling approach and initial data set. In particular, we created a range of scenarios to define the inputs for the simulated population to create uncertainty in the down-select results that was consistent with our level of understanding of the CP.
| MIEM PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
The independent support contractor evaluated the quality of our MIEM predictions using three measures that IARPA set: mean squared error (MSE), 60% certainty interval calibration (CIC), and an interval scoring rule (ISR), as defined below. The ground truth answer (or the independent support contractor's estimate of the ground truth answer based on expert judgment) is a i . Our prediction of ground truth is x i . Our lower (upper) response for the 60% certainty interval is l i (u i ).
where 1 with a subscript after it is a variable (characteristic function) that equals 1 if the subscript expression is true and 0 if the subscript expression is false. Lower values of MSE and ISR are better, with zero being the best. By definition, 0.6 is the best CIC. IARPA specified that success on the CIC measure was a performance range from 0.6 AE 0.2 in the first year and AE0.15 in the second year. The independent support contractor created a baseline model-a Bayesian network developed with expert judgment. The purpose of this baseline model was to generate independent estimates of the answers to CP questions and to benchmark the performance of competitors on each CP.
Using the ground truth answer for each CP question (or an independent estimate of the ground truth based on expert judgment, if no ground truth answer was available), the independent support contractor calculated the evaluation metrics for each competing team on each CP. IARPA's use of an independent support contractor to perform this function provides assurance that the results each competing team achieved on the evaluation metrics can be accepted as valid. Figure 5 shows the evaluation metrics for CPs 1-14 for the baseline model, competitors 1, competitors 2, and our team (IDI). The blue bars reference the CPs where the competitors were asked to identify behaviors (CPs 1-9), whereas the orange bars reference the CPs where the competitors were asked to evaluate the system (CPs 10-14). For the mean squared error and Interval Scoring Rule, the target for the competitors was to be below 50% of the baseline (as indicated by the orange and blue dashed lines). For the Certainty Interval Calibration, the target was to be within 0.6 AE 0.2 (as indicated by the black solid and dashed lines).
As shown in Figure 5 , our team was far superior to the other two teams and the independent support contractor's baseline model for the Identification of Behaviors task on the first nine CPs for which very little information about the threat population was provided and ground truth was estimated using expert judgment. One of the research objectives was to achieve an MSE and ISR that was less than 50% of the MSE and ISR of the baseline model, respectively. Our team achieved this goal for the Identification of Behaviors CPs, while the other teams did worse than the baseline model. On the last five CPs that addressed the evaluation of system capabilities and included ground truth data, our team far exceeded the other two teams and the baseline model on MSE and ISR. The second competitor achieved comparable results on CIC with our team while the first team was never able to reach 40% on the CIC measure. The research goal on the CIC measure was to be within 40-80% on CIC. Our team was very near 60% across all 14 CPs. The competition was terminated 6 months early after the first 14 CPs.
To illustrate these measures in more detail on specific CP consider Figure 6 , which shows plots of the mean and CIC for our multiple models and our fused solution for CP 16. In this CP, there were six sets of three questions. The first three 
FIGURE 5 Summary of evaluation metrics for challenge problems (CPs) 1-14 for the baseline model, competitors 1, competitors 2, and our team at IDI. The blue bars reference the CPs where the competitors were asked to identify behaviors (CPs 1-9) , where as the orange bars reference the CPs where the competitors were asked to evaluate the the system (CPs 10-14 ). The baseline model used a Bayesian network to develop a reference point for evaluating the competitors. For the mean square error and Interval Scoring Rule, the target for the competitors was to be below 50% of the baseline (as indicated by the orange and blue dashed lines). For the Certainty Interval Calibration, the target was to be within 0.6 AE 0.2 (as indicated by the black solid and dashed lines) questions in each of the six sets were to predict the precision, recall, and false positive rate. The first two sets (top of Figure 6 ) were to provide answers using a Naïve Bayes down-select algorithm: the first three predictions dealt with online search behavior of the employees, while the second three predictions dealt with exfiltration of data behavior. The third and fourth sets dealt with the same issues but were based on a Random Forest down-select algorithm. Parameters in both the Naïve Bayes and Random Forest algorithms were to be estimated based on meeting precision, recall, and false positive rate predictions for an initial set of data that was provided. As a result, none of these down-select algorithms were optimized in any way for performance and do not reflect how well these algorithms could perform for these problems. The fifth and sixth sets dealt with the addition of a new sensor that could detect USB insertions on non-Windows machines. For these final two sets, only the exfiltration of data behavior was addressed using both Naïve Bayes and Random Forests algorithms that were again estimated based on an initial data set.
Precisio n Recall FAR Precisio n Recall FAR Our team had four distinct teams creating models that produced answers for the 18 questions in CP 16. The four models are labeled "G" for George Mason University, "H" for Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO), "I_C" for IDI, which used Copulas for population modeling, and "I_D" for IDI, which used discrete event simulation for population modeling. The G and H models used Copulas for population modeling. For each question, there is a 60% certainty interval and mean for four models and the fused model that combined the 60% certainty intervals and means of the four models. The fused model is shown first for each question and labeled "F." The blue dots represent the mean while the gray bands represent the 60% certainty interval (20th percentile to 80th percentile). The fused model has a darker gray band to distinguish it from the other models. If the ground truth answer was inside the 60% certainty interval of the fusion model, the horizontal line designating ground truth is colored green, otherwise it is colored red. For this CP, 50% of the ground truth answers were inside the 60% certainty interval of the fusion model, which means the CIC score is 50%. For this CP, the 60% certainty interval of the fusion model is noticeably larger in most cases than the 60% certainty intervals of any individual models, which is the result of none of the individual models sharing much overlap for a given question. None of the individual models come close to a 50% CIC score on this CP. This was not true for all the CPs. successful outcomes. There is also a considerable amount of variability in the size of the 60% certainty interval across the CP questions ( Figure 8 ). The average size of this interval measure is 0.2 with over half of the ranges being 0.2 or less. As shown in Figure 6 for CP 16, the 60% certainty intervals varied greatly in size by question. The full data set of CPs, questions, question type, ground truth value or estimate (IPE), our team's point prediction, upper and lower limit of the 60% certainty interval, CIC score (1 or 0), MSE, and ISR are provided in an appendix. Table 4 provides evidence that our MIEM approach was dramatically more successful than the collection of individual models upon which it was based. Since the CPs changed dramatically over the course of the research period, we did not have a single modeling method that was used in many of the CPs. Rather our approach was to have multiple modeling teams at IDI, GMU, and HumRRO. The number of modeling teams changed between two and five across the CPs. The number in parentheses next to Feeder in the second column of Table 4 is the number of models developed for that CP. The comparison across all CPs using all models is shown at the top of Table 4 . The average MSE for the fused model was nearly one third of the average MSE of the feeder modes. The average CIC of the fused model, at 0.66, was just 10% higher than goal of 0.60, well within an acceptable band for calibration, while the average CIC of the feeder models, at 0.19, was clearly unacceptable. Abbreviations: CIC, certainty interval calibration; CP, challenge problem; ISR, interval scoring rule; MSE, mean squared error. Values with no asterisk indicate that the fused model performed significantly better (fused score ≤ 50% of the feeder score for MSE and ISR, or fused score < 0.8 for CIC) than the feeder models for the column metric. A single asterisk indicates that the fused model performed better than the feeder models, but not significantly (fused score at least 50-67% of the feeder score for MSE and ISR, not relevant for CIC). A double asterisk indicates that the two methods performed about the same.
The averages across all feeder models for all CPs for the three measures (MSE = 0.099, CIC = 0.19, ISR = 1.03) are just a little better than the independent support contractor's baseline model on each of the three measures (MSE = 0.118, CIC = 0.14, ISR = 1.18). The fused model was significantly or nearly significantly better than the feeder models on 12 of the 16 CPs for MSE, 11 for CIC, and 9 for ISR.
| THE SCIENCE AND PROMISE OF IEM AND MIEM
Our research results demonstrate the viability and successful application of the IEM concept. This IEM effort required estimation of both the mean and uncertainty, as captured by a 60% certainty interval. As individual data was not available, the approach had to be based upon aggregated data or summary statistics (e.g., means, SD, histograms, correlations, and autocorrelations). Our MIEM approach for creating a range of simulated populations worked very well and was the major source of uncertainty in our results to date. This approach significantly differed from the approaches that the two competing teams and the creator of the baseline model used. Our approach significantly outperformed these other approaches on the three metrics used for evaluation that address both the central tendency (MSE) as well as the uncertainty in the answer (CIC and ISR).
Multimodeling has been evolving in the forecasting, predictive analytics, and engineering domains for over 25 years, with few research efforts providing evidence that multimodeling is not effective or efficient. This research adds to the large amount of literature on the effectiveness and efficiency of multimodeling, while providing specific evidence for improving insider threat detection.
We have demonstrated an application of MIEM to insider threat detection, specifically to estimating how well a system classifies insiders as a threat (alert) or not a threat (no alert) based on detector data that measure insider behaviors. Alerts are commonly generated from detector data using a fusion algorithm and associated decision threshold(s) the system use(s) to classify an individual as a threat or not a threat. MIEM connects detector data with knowledge about the population of insiders who behave in ways that could cause concern. As part of this work, we have created and are extending an advanced insider threat indicator ontology to inform the models. In addition, we are creating a processing platform consisting of reusable elements for integrating multiple modeling workflows associated with MIEM.
MIEM should be particularly useful to organizations that are (a) considering investments in additional detectors or additional processing power, or (b) evaluating new algorithms and thresholds for identifying insiders of concern for further investigation. Aggregated data or expert judgments are likely to be the only data available when analyzing such investments. MIEM is applicable to diverse domains that involve human behavior, detectors, fusion algorithms, threshold settings and missing data on behaviors of concern. Examples include: security, anti-terrorism, fraud prevention, insider trading, and general risk management.
This paper introduces IEM as a scientific endeavor and MIEM as one of potentially many successful implementations of IEM. An IEM science should be able to address the following questions:
• How might the validity of an IEM be assessed?
• How might the expected accuracy of an IEM be measured?
• What are the effects of adding data sources or modifying inference methods?
• What additional data should be collected and analyzed by an IE to best improve the accuracy of inferences?
• What combination of modeling methods will produce the most accurate inferences for an IE with given characteristics? Some of the critical challenges that must be addressed to achieve useful answers to these questions are: • Evaluating the quality of an IE • Assessing the validity of an IEM • Accommodating noisy, heterogeneous, and incomplete data • Coping with unbalanced data sets (rare events) • Addressing privacy, proprietary, and security concerns • Coping with adversarial behavior underlying data generation • Addressing phenomena that vary with time across the IE • Understanding causal relationships between IE components (i.e., data and methods) 8 | RELATED SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES AND RESEARCH AREAS Dr. Paul Lehner, the IARPA SCITE Program Manager, introduced this new concept of an IEM. In this paper, we introduce multimodeling as a successful implementation of IEM and describe the MIEM approach as the creation of simulated populations followed by the examination of one or more down-select algorithms. There is evidence of similar population simulation in the fields of population genetics, environmental wildlife estimation, and human population estimation.
In population genetics (Calafell, Grigorenko, Chikanian, & Kidd, 2001; Hahn, Ritchie, & Moore, 2003; Kimmel & Shamir, 2005; Miller et al., 2009; Peng & Kimmel, 2007; Yuan, Miller, Zhang, Herrington, & Wang, 2012; Zhang et al., 2004) , there are three major simulation categories: coalescent, forward-time, and resampling (Yuan et al., 2012) . The coalescent approach is based on the concept of the most recent common ancestor (Kingman, 2000) . This approach does not translate to the IEM world as we have defined and understand it. The forward-time approach (Peng, Kimmel, & Amos, 2012) creates an initial, ancestral population and then propagates that ancestral population into the future. This approach could be useful for some insider threat topics but was not used in our efforts to date. Resampling, also described as bootstrapping, is one of the approaches used in our MIEM approach but primarily for the down-select algorithms after the insider threat populations have been generated.
Another research area in which simulated populations are created is wildlife, with fisheries as a good example (Bush, 1999; NOAA, 2008) . Hoban (2014) describes many such software packages for simulating populations in the field of molecular ecology, which addresses genetic, population, and environmental processes. Important features of the population simulation tools for molecular ecology are: landscapes (identification of migrants, capturing the effects of natural and human-made barriers, identify and understand spatially shifting ranges, predicting meta-population dynamics, and detecting local adaptation), life history of selected individuals and subpopulations, inter-species interactions, adaptive traits and genomics, and movement behaviors. In fact, a similar tool exists for simulating the world population of humans (Rowell, 2018) .
The simulation of human population is like that described above for wildlife, primarily for estimating population growth over decades and centuries.
We used far more extensive modeling ideas for addressing the uncertainty associated with the simulated populations. In addition to using multiple modeling approaches such as discrete event simulation and copulas (see Table 1 ), our effort created scenarios that varied correlation and autocorrelation assumptions, as well as assumptions about how the population might change over time. We believe it was the population multimodeling that differentiated our results from those of competitor 2.
| CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This paper documents our multimodeling approach for IEM and the associated success achieved by this MIEM approach. This effort addressed a spectrum of problems (CPs) that fall within the prediction category of inductive inference. Our MIEM approach achieved strong success in terms of MSE and calibration (both CIC and ISR) with minimally sized certainty ranges. One of our lessons learned was that we often achieved too high scores on CIC for questions where our uncertainty was the smallest. As a result, we reduced the size of our certainty intervals on questions where there was less uncertainty.
Since the diversity of CPs was substantial, our MIEM approach employed a diverse set of modeling methods for creating both the simulated populations and the down-select algorithms for identifying potential threats. We used linear opinion pooling with some expert judgment as our approach for fusing the probability distributions across the models in MIEM. We are now undertaking an exploration of other model fusion methods.
Future work will also address uncertainty that is modeled by using multiple down-select and model fusion algorithms. During our work, we were asked to use a range of down-select algorithms for determining how many individuals should be considered for further investigation. During this process, we realized that some approaches did noticeably better than others on CPs 15 and 16. We are currently using several augmented versions of CPs 10, 14, and 15 to test the applicability of a spectrum of down-select algorithms. We will also investigate if the fusion of multiple down-select algorithms can perform better than any one of the down-select algorithms (Mahoney, Comstock, DeBlois, & Darcy, 2011) .
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